In this article we use a social representational perspective on a large sample of European students to consider the interplay between pacifist attitudes and representations of World War I (WWI). WWI gave rise to pacifist movements across the globe. Across 10 European countries (N ϭ 1,347 undergraduate students), we invited participants to report the first 5 words that came to their mind when thinking about this event and measured their level of pacifism. Analyses of the reported words revealed the presence of seven lexical classes corresponding to 2 main perspectives on WWI. The first main perspective was characterized by "analytical" representations of the war, with a focus on the places and actors of WWI.
found that the pacifist attitudes we analyzed were associated with a view of the conflict in terms of negatively valanced words, both at the emotional level and in terms of concrete consequences. Conversely lower pacifist attitudes were linked with an emphasis upon weapons. The present results help fill a gap in the literature on attitudes toward peace and war by evidencing their interplay with the way individuals view war. These findings allow us to establish a connection between mainstream, individualcentered approach to attitudes relying on individual premises and social representation theory. Moreover, in line with historical scholarship, these results suggest that a common interpretational framework underlies a view of the conflict associated with the pacifist wave that emerged 100 years ago and current pacifist attitudes. Finally, the present study is the first large scale psychology study of the social representations of the Great War.
Public Significance Statement
The present study shows that pacifist attitudes of young European students are still linked to the way they represent the Great War. These results suggest that a common interpretational framework underlies a view of the conflict associated with the pacifist wave that emerged 100 years ago and current pacifist attitudes.
Keywords: attitudes, Europe, pacifism, social representations, WWI Is peace the opposite of war? Or can war be the condition for peace? Such questions, and more generally the nature of the relation between war and peace, have preoccupied humans for ages. Think for example, of just war theory (jus bellum iustum) dating back to pre-Christian era or the more modern concept of preventive war (already developed by Hugo Grotius, 1625 , this question spans cultures and ages. In psychology, this issue has been discussed in terms of people's attitudes toward peace and war, attitudes being defined as "evaluations individuals hold towards elements in their environment" (Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 2005 , cited by Sammut, 2015, p. 97) . Psychological research on this topic emerged in the 1930s, a period marked both by an unprecedented wave of pacifism and by the anticipation of a new impending conflict (see e.g., Chant & Salter, 1937; Droba, 1931; Farnsworth, 1937; Pihlblad, 1935) . Concurrently, psychology has witnessed a growing interest in attitudes toward peace and war, accompanied with debates surrounding the very nature of this concept (e.g., Bizumic et al., 2013; Cohrs & Moschner, 2002; Nelson & Milburn, 1999 ; Van der Linden, Leys, Klein, & Bouchat, 2017) . At the conceptual level, several authors define attitudes toward war as the moral evaluation of the use of war/violence as a way of resolving conflictual situations (see McAlister, Bandura, & Owen, 2006) . Correspondingly, attitudes toward peace involve the rejection of violence and acceptance of social harmony.
While there is a strong tradition of research into people's attitudes toward peace and war, we surprisingly know little about people's representation of its object. Yet, in order to evaluate a complex object such as war, an individual naturally needs to have information about this object (see Moliner & Tafani, 1997) . Considering the links between representations of war and attitudes toward peace and war will be the main focus of this article. To achieve this, we will: (a) demonstrate the relevance of a social representational perspective in the study of attitudes; and (b) briefly highlight the relation between WWI, its traces in European collective memory, and the development of pacifist ideology.
A Social Representational Perspective
The first goal of the present study is to show that, despite different epistemological premises, a social representational perspective is especially appropriate in the study of the relations between attitudes toward peace and war and one of their main representational objects: war. Social representations are bodies of knowledge shared among group members. For instance, there are social representations of what it means to be a woman, a doctor, but also of justice and democracy. Social representations help people make sense of the world (Moscovici, 2000) and contribute to the formation of group identities (Breakwell, 1993) . Beyond referring to specific concepts, the social representations approach also offers a unique perspective on social psychological phenomena (Laszlo, 1997) . Indeed, social representations are considered as being shared across minds rather than within them (Wagner & Hayes, 2005) . From this perspective, an individual is "ontologically" part of the social sphere (Sammut, 2015) and the representational object cannot be separated from the subject.
1 This approach to social psychological phenomena is radically different from the more individualistic perspectives traditionally adopted in research into attitudes. Indeed, while social representations are primarily of a collective nature, the concept of attitude is grounded on an individualistic premise (Moliner & Tafani, 1997) . It is first and foremost the individual who evaluates the objects of her environment. Despite the variety of its definitions, the idea that an attitude is an attribute of the individual is widely accepted (for a review, see Eagly & Chaiken, 2007) . From this standpoint, an attitude is clearly distinct from a social representation, both epistemologically and conceptually. Still, attitudes are often addressed specifically from a social representational perspective. This is especially true of the sociodynamic approach to social representations.
The Sociodynamic Approach
In the sociodynamic approach, social representations are considered as having been produced by groups such as the rich or immigrants, who occupy a specific position in society (Doise, Clémence, & Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1992) . In this approach, attitudes and social representations correspond to different levels of analysis. Social representations are a function of an ideological and collective level and concern the relations between a group and its social system (Salès-Wuillemin, Stewart, & Dautun, 2004) . In contrast, attitudes are considered as being more individual in nature and as relating to the interaction between an individual and his or her social system (Doise, 1982 (Doise, , 1985 . The individual, depending on their position within the social system, possesses a specific perspective on a given object. This perspective will guide the individual's evaluation of the object. In this case, an attitude can be considered as a specific act of position-taking an individual makes (individual-level) inside a common frame of interpretation (societallevel) .
In summary, this approach constitutes a compelling way of appraising the nature of the relations between attitudes and their representational objects. It shows that attitudes and social representations, while concerning different levels of analysis, can be interpreted within a common framework that is truly social psychological. From this perspective, rather than being considered as antagonistic, attitudes and social representations can be interpreted in a dialectic relation (see Van der Linden, Bizumic, Stubager, & Mellon, 2011) . Attitudes toward an object are determined by the way an individual represents it (the common frame of interpretation), but the object's representation will also be influenced by the way the individual evaluates it (from his position in the social system). But what do we know about attitudes toward peace and war and their representational object, war?
Representations of War and Attitudes Toward Peace and War
The relation between representations of war and pacifist attitudes has received little attention in social psychological literature as both approaches originate from very different traditions to date (for a notable exception, see Cohrs & O'Dwyer, 2018) . More precisely, the question has been explicitly addressed in two empirical articles. The first (Herrera & Reicher, 1998) investigated the categorization of the Gulf War by prowar and antiwar undergraduate British students. This study found that, when asked to rate images from the war featured in the press, pro-and antiwar participants used different categories to characterize the same event. Prowar students categorized war as opposing the civilized world to Iraqi troops-embodied in the image of the dictator Saddam Hussein. In contrast, antiwar respondents interpreted the Gulf War in terms of an opposition between ordinary people (humanity) and business and political leaders. The second article 1 An individual cannot exist in the absence of a social environment, just as a representational object cannot exist without the meaning attributed to it by a group of individuals. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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addressed the question of the relation between attitudes toward peace and war and the representations of war-viewed as a generic concept (Van der Linden et al., 2011) . Its authors adopted a social representational approach. First, they asked participants-Danish and American undergraduate students-to report their social representations of peace and war through a word association task. Next, using the Attitudes toward Peace and War Scale (APWS; see below), they appraised participants' attitudes toward peace and war. Then, running a hierarchical classification analysis (see Reinert, 1983 Reinert, , 1990 , they distinguished between clusters of pro and antiwar attitudes. Finally, they showed that while social representations of peace and war were only weakly related to the clusters based on the attitudes, pro-and antiwar attitudes were linked to different representations. Prowar attitudes were linked to representations of war containing concepts such as "bomb," "necessary," "aggression," and "dictatorship." Conversely, antiwar attitudes were linked to representations depicting war as associated with "fear," "poverty," and "hate." While a term such as "necessity" does not directly fit into these categories, most of the other terms fit with classical notions of war outlined by peace researchers (e.g., armed conflict, direct and indirect violence; Van der Linden et al., 2011) . In summary, despite the small number of studies on the topic, we can see that prowar attitudes are linked to representations of the conflict as an opposition between the "civilized world" and an army of "villains" represented by a dictator. War is also perceived as a necessary evil. Finally, participants characterized by a high level of prowar attitudes put an emphasis on the weapons used and linked this to the idea of aggression. Antiwar attitudes, on the other hand, are linked to representations of war as opposing humanity to political and economic leaders. For people with antiwar attitudes, war is also linked to negative and aversive emotions and represented in terms of negative and concrete consequences. In the present article, we also investigate the relation between attitudes toward peace and war and social representations of war. But rather than considering war in general, we focus on a conflict that constituted the matrix of pacifism in the 20th century and that influenced attitudes toward peace and war on a time scale never seen before: the First World War.
Great War and Pacifism
On June 28, 1914, Gavrilo Princip, a young Bosnian Serb, assassinated Franz-Ferdinand, heir to the throne of AustriaHungary, in Sarajevo. This event was the trigger of a war of a new kind, the First World War (WWI). Between 1914 and 1918, the Allies (mainly France, Russia, and the United Kingdom) confronted the members of the Central Powers (mainly AustriaHungary, Germany, and the Ottoman Empire) in the first industrialized and global war. The conflict was characterized, among other aspects, by the extreme brutality of trench warfare and the use of chemical weapons. After 4 years of fighting, the Central Powers were defeated. More than 17 million people were killed and the European continent was devastated.
While WWI may share many features with other wars, it is idiosyncratic in many ways. An aspect of WWI that is of special relevance to this article is its association with the rise of pacifism. Although the concept existed before WWI (Cooper, 1991) , the end of the war saw the rise of pacifism in many societies (Olivera & Offenstadt, 1993; Siegel, 2004) . According to the historian René Rémond (1984) , the experience of suffering and the war's atrocities led many individuals to turn to pacifism. Faced with catastrophe and the relative absurdity of the conflict, it soon became necessary to give meaning to the sacrifice of so many lives (Haddat, 2012) . As a result, WWI was quickly reframed as "the war to end all wars"-at least for the victorious nations. During the interwar period, pacifist ideas were channeled into concrete political decisions. For example, members of the British Labor Party pleaded in favor of a unilateral disarmament while French Socialists voted for the suspension of military credits (Rémond, 1984) . At an international level, the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, signed by 63 countries, condemned the use of war to resolve conflicts (Josephson, 1979) . This desire to avoid the disaster of war later may have contributed to the failure of the politics of appeasement toward the Nazi regime (Brock & Young, 1999) . In this sense, the first global conflict constituted the original matrix of pacifism.
Thus, WWI is historically linked to the rise of an important pacifist current throughout the world. Further, recent evidence suggests that the first global conflict is also linked to the pacifist attitudes of young Europeans today. More specifically, Bouchat et al. (2017) have shown that indicators of victimization at two distinct levels are linked to pacifist attitudes spanning over 100 years. At the societal level, the death toll suffered by a country during the war is positively linked to the level of pacifist attitudes shared by young Europeans. However, at the familial level, the presence of an ancestor who fought or died during the war in their family, is negatively associated with their endorsement of pacifist attitudes. In line with previous findings by Elcheroth (2006) , the authors suggest that countries that faced considerable war trauma would develop social representations valuing a peaceful coexistence. However, at the family level, resentment would remain present.
Given the role of WWI in the emergence of pacifism, the association between representations of this conflict and pacifist attitudes is particularly interesting. Using the social representational approach outlined above and in line with the results of the two previous studies, we have formulated the following hypotheses.
According to the sociodynamic approach, antiwar and prowar individuals should possess different perspectives on WWI. More specifically:
Hypothesis 1: Antiwar attitudes are expected to be linked to negative evaluations of the conflict, both in terms of emotions and concrete consequences. They should also be linked to a set of representations opposing the "people" to the elites.
Hypothesis 2: Prowar attitudes should be associated with representations of the conflict stressing the following aspects: its necessity, a moral opposition between "good people" and villains, the view of war as defense against an aggression, and an emphasis on military equipment.
Method
A large interdisciplinary survey was designed in order to address these hypotheses. This survey (an online questionnaire)-designed by historians and social psychologists as part of a collaborative project action funded by the European COST This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
132
Program 2 -was run between March 2014 and July 2015. As part of their psychology or history courses or in exchange for credits, 1,347 participants from 10 European countries completed the survey. These 10 countries included the main European actors of the war: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Russia, Serbia, Turkey, and United Kingdom. In each country, with the exception of France and Germany, data were collected in a single university. The samples' characteristics are provided in Table 1 . The online survey, which was approved by the ethical committee of the department of psychology of the first author, was distributed through LimeSurvey (Schmitz, 2012) and presented to the participants in their language of education (questionnaires were translated and then back-translated from an original English version). Completing the full questionnaire took on average 30 min.
The convenience sample was composed of university students (63.4% women) whose average age was 23.37 (SD ϭ 6.43). The universities were selected because they were represented by scholars taking part in a COST European collaborative research network that spanned the whole continent. 56.6% of the participants were psychology students, 21.6% history students and 20.1% were students in social science programs. Distributions of gender and study program varied across subsamples (gender: 2 (9, N ϭ 1,346) ϭ 144.5, p Ͻ .001; study program: 2 (18, N ϭ 1,325) ϭ 492.4, p Ͻ .001). The specificities of the sample (overrepresentation of women and the fact that universities tend to have a body of students that are, for example, more left-leaning) limited the generalizability of the results. However, investigating the links between social representations of WWI and attitudes on such a large-scale sample of European university students is already a significant step forward: It indeed allows to appraise the relation between two constructs (social representations and attitudes) originating from different epistemological traditions in a much larger and diversified sample than previous studies bearing on this relation. Thus, while inevitably limited, the current results offer promising perspectives. Besides the demographics questions, the survey was composed of a large set of measures, most of which are not relevant to this article. 3 We focus on the following measures.
Social Representations of WWI
The first question of the survey aimed at appraising the participants' social representations of the war. They were asked to write the first five ideas that came instantly to their mind when they thought about the First World War. The main advantage of this type of question is that it allows us to grasp the core aspects of a social representation (i.e., the main constituents and structure of a shared representation) in a limited number of words (see Lo Monaco, Piermatteo, Rateau, & Tavani, 2017) . Compared with preestablished scales that often focus only on consensual aspects while ignoring divergent opinions (see Rose et al., 1995) , this prompt allows us to consider a broader set of representations while being more easily translatable and amenable to coding than more open questions (see, e.g., Liu et al., 2005 , see also Hilton & Liu, 2008) .
Pacifism
The level of attitudes toward peace and war of the participants was appraised using the APWS (Bizumic et al., 2013) . This scale is composed of 16 items such as "There is no conceivable justification for war" and "Our country's first priority should be world peace." Responses were made on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very strongly). Although the scale is composed of two subdimensions (attitudes toward peace and attitudes toward war), a factor analysis showed that the items highly loaded on one main factor. This factor/dimension is characterized on one side by a high adhesion to peace and a rejection of war/violence and on the other side by a positive evaluation of war and a low adhesion to peace. Therefore, we computed an indicator using the 16 items. A low score on the computed scale indicates positive evaluation of war and a low adhesion to peace. On the opposite, a high score suggests high adhesion to peace and a rejection of war/violence. Depending on the subsamples, Cronbach's alphas vary from .79 to .89, suggesting a good internal consistency. Mean level and standard deviation of pacifist attitudes are provided for each sample in Table 1 .
Results

Data Analysis Procedure
The five ideas provided by each participant were translated in English by native speakers. The translated words were introduced in a text file (.txt) where each entry corresponded to one participant. 4 This text corpus was then analyzed using IRAMUTEQ (Ratinaud, 2009) , an interface of the R software, allowing for multidimensional content analyses. The words composing the corpus were then cleaned of misspellings and automatically lemmatized by the program (terms expressing a similar semantic content were aggregated; i.e., trench and trenches, slaughter and slaughtering). Among the 10,024 occurrences, 1,695 active forms were found of which 53.16% were hapax (appeared only once). The first step of the analyses consisted in running a descending hierarchical classification analysis in order to investigate the structure of the representations of the war (see Reinert, 1983 Reinert, , 1990 ). This analysis revealed differences and proximities between lexical items. We then interpreted the main classes of items and highlighted their key characteristics.
Social Representations of WWI
Seven lexical classes were automatically extracted (see Table  2 ).
5 The three first classes-Classes 1, 6, and 4 -were closely linked. They represented 17.5%, 13.8%, and 16.2% of the total lexical information, respectively, and focus mainly on the actors (i.e., soldiers, Entente, Central Powers), objects (i.e., mustard-gas, 2 COST Network "Social Representations of History in the enlarged European Union." http://www.cost.eu/COST_Actions/isch/IS1205.
3 The full version of the questionnaire is available at: https://osf.io/ smuk8/?view_onlyϭ00d86911f44a403797f78743528d2939. 4 The text file is available at: https://osf.io/hw2za. More information concerning the formatting of the text corpus is available at: http://www .iramuteq.org/documentation/formatage-des-corpus-texte. An English tutorial illustrating formatting instructions is available at: http://www.iramuteq .org/documentation#section-3. 5 We asked for a high number of classes at the end of the first round of analysis (20) in order to obtain detailed results. Apart from that, the defaults values of the program were maintained. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
rifle, machine-guns, shells), places (Verdun, Isonzo, Europe), and formal consequences of war (i.e., treaty, Trianon, end, Versailles, peace). More specifically, Class 6 mainly included objects and Class 4 mainly emphasized the formal consequences of the conflict. These classes show representations of the war that seem analytical as they focus mainly on formal aspects of the conflict in a detached way. These representations resemble experts' appraisals.
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The second main lexical category was formed of Classes 3, 2, and 5 (7.4%, 13.3%, and 16.4%, respectively). The three classes were composed of negative evaluations, negative emotions, and concrete negative consequences of the war. Each class was quite specific. Class 3 focused mainly on a moral evaluation of the war (i.e., injustice, history, politics, stupidity). Class 2 emphasized the negative consequences (i.e., poverty, destruction, death, victim) and emotions (i.e., sadness, hate, sorrow, mourn) and finally, Class 5 was characterized by the concrete and negative conditions of the conflict (i.e., blood, hunger, pain, wound, cold). In summary, these three classes were composed of social representations of the war that mainly emphasized its negative valence. Finally, Class 7 was characterized by elements associated with the Serbian experience of the war (i.e., Gavrilo Princip, Cer, Salonika, Corfu). For a summary of the main lexical categories, see Table 3 .
Links With Specific Illustrative Variables
The descending hierarchical classification analysis not only reveals classes but also their interrelations and their links with illustrative variables. It shows that some classes of representations are more or less linked with specific variables (i.e., gender, nationality, status of the country during WWI, type of study). Addressing the relations between lexical classes and these variables is not the main aim of the present study. However, a brief analysis of these links gives precious information on the repartition of the representations according to individual and national characteristics.
We observed that there were two basic groups of classes-the "negative valence" and the "analytical" classes-and a single additional one-Class 7 (see Table 4 ). Class 7 is the least central one and is characterized by an overrepresentation of Serbian participants (see Table 4 ). The lexical classes therefore appear to be associated with specific nationalities. The participants of the former allied countries (the Entente) are overrepresented in Classes 1 (analytical) and 3 (moral evaluation). By contrast, several countries belonging to the ex-Central powers are overrepresented in Classes 4 and 6 (the analytical classes; see Table 4 ). Other illustrative variables are also related to specific classes: Psychology students are overrepresented in Classes 2, 3, 5 (negative evaluation), and 1, while history students are preferentially found in Class 4. Finally, women are overrepresented in the three "negative evaluation" classes and in Class 1 and men in two out of the three "analytical" classes.
Social Representations and Pacifist Attitudes
In order to appraise the links between pacifist attitudes and social representations, we divided participants into two categories based on the median of the pacifist scale (Mdn ϭ 5.50, M ϭ 5.40, SD ϭ .95). This allowed us to distinguish the 50% of the participants who were more pacifist than the other half. 7 We first appraised the link between pacifist attitudes and the seven classes highlighted in the previous analysis. Although the effects were small (moderate), pacifist attitudes were related to social representations of WWI. This result suggests that those with strong pacifist attitudes (high pacifists) occupy different positions in the representational field of WWI when compared with those with weaker pacifist attitudes (low pacifists; see Table 2 ).
More specifically, high pacifists are overrepresented in Class 2, 2 (1, N ϭ 1,347) ϭ 6.6, p ϭ .01 and in Class 3, 2 (1, N ϭ 1,347) ϭ 8.7, p ϭ .09. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, this shows that high pacifists appear to view the conflict more in terms of negative evaluations, both at the emotional level (sadness, hate, sorrow) and in terms of concrete consequences (poverty, destruction, death, mourn). However, it is not clear whether the opposition 6 The interpretations we make of the different analytical classes do not exhaust their content. Nevertheless, they tend to illustrate the main trends in these classes. 7 Given that the median is quite high, we have to keep in mind that we probably distinguish between the most pacifists and the other half of participants, who are less pacifistic but still probably not militaristic either. The median split was performed on the whole sample, regardless of the nationality of the participants. We opted for this choice because our aim was the analysis of the relation between attitudes and representations regardless of nationality. between leaders and masses can be found in either of these two classes. Conversely, low pacifists are more present in Class 6, 2 (1, N ϭ 1,347) ϭ 5.5, p ϭ .02. In line with Hypothesis 2, this result shows that lower pacifist attitudes are linked to representations of weapons (mustard-gas, rifle, machine-guns, shell). However, there is no mention of the necessity of the conflict and of the opposition between "good guys" and villains. 8 Finally, an analysis of the specificities was carried out in order to appraise the representations that were the most associated with pacifist attitudes. This allowed us to find the words on which high pacifists and low pacifists were most differentiated. High pacifists were associated with representations of the war that stressed its negative consequences (poverty, casualty) and the concrete conditions of the fighting (bomb, blood, cold). Still, there was no mention of the opposition between leaders and masses and of the negative emotions. By contrast, low pacifists were characterized by representations of the war's consequences (victory, treaty) that were of a more positive and political nature, by more detached representations of the fighting (warfare, Verdun), the figure of the emperor, and weapons (weapon, shell).
Discussion
We began this article with a discussion of the gap in the literature concerning attitudes of peace and war. While the field is well developed and anchored in a long tradition of research, little is known about the representational objects of these attitudes. Starting from the obvious premise that in order to be able to evaluate something, one has to have a representation of it, we investigated the relationship between pacifist attitudes and the social representations of WWI on a specific sample of European students. To our knowledge, the first global conflict is particularly appropriate to study this relation given its strong historical links with the pacifist wave and its lasting impact on current pacifist attitudes (see Bouchat et al., 2017) .
Building on a large and diversified sample of students, the present study provides evidence that, in the case of the samples analyzed, pacifist attitudes are linked to social representations of the Great War. These results suggest the relevance of the social representational perspective in the study of attitudes. In line with previous findings (see Herrera & Reicher, 1998; Van der Linden et al., 2011) , our results show that high levels of pacifist attitudes are linked to negative evaluations of the war and a focus on its concrete and negative consequences. The young Europeans place emphasis on the outcomes of the conflict but none of them being of strategic or political nature. This way of representing WWI is similar to what Rémond (1984) and later Haddat (2012) described as having led to the development of the pacifist current: "As the call to co-operate with the enemy is unlikely to be heard, it is the horrors of war that are invoked in an attempt to 'visualize' warlike violence" (Haddat, 2012) . In this case, the pacifist wave of the interwar period and current pacifist attitudes seem associated to a similar interpretation of the conflict. This finding does not prove that social representations of the conflict in the direct postwar period are identical to the current ones shared by European students but still suggests that a common interpretational framework underlies the view of the conflict associated with the pacifist wave that emerged 100 years ago and current pacifist attitudes. Further, students who are characterized by the highest level of pacifist attitudes appear to interpret WWI mainly through a moral and emotional prism. Such a result suggests that rejection of war would be associated much more with emotional and moral representations than with macrosocial and political arguments. Conversely, less pacifist students represent war in a more detached and analytical way than their high pacifist counterparts. In this case, the representations that they share seem to be more a matter of knowledge than a matter of feelings or morality. Still, less pacifist students do not mention positive aspects of the war, nor do they glorify it. Broadly speaking, the less pacifist students show that they know things about the Great War-especially the famous battles, political consequences, and weapons used at that time.
The replication of the main findings of the first two studies on the topic across a large range of national contexts to which our participants are exposed helps fill a gap in the literature on attitudes toward peace and war. Indeed, results show that pacifist attitudes are linked to specific representational objects. Further, we have shown that the evaluations an individual makes about peace 8 When performed on three groups of pacifists (corresponding to the three main percentiles) instead of two, the analyses reveal highly similar results. High pacifists are overrepresented in "negative evaluation" classes while low pacifists are slightly overrepresented in "analytical classes." Mid pacifists are not overrepresented in any lexical class. Note. The numbers in the second row correspond to the percentages of total information represented by each class. For instance, Class 7 regroups (weights) 15.4% of the total lexical information (i.e., 100%). The numbers in parentheses are chi-square values. 2 indicates the strength of the link between the variables and the classes. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
and war-one's attitudes-are linked to representations that are shared at the societal level (inside a common interpretational framework). By highlighting the collective nature of the representations of war, we confirm the epistemological and methodological relevance of a sociorepresentational perspective in the study of attitudes. Repositioning the study of attitudes toward war and peace in a multilevel perspective therefore opens up new avenues of research on a subject that has remained focused on individuals for a long time (see, e.g., Bouchat et al., 2017) . While most of our findings are consistent with those of previous studies, some results are not in line with our hypotheses. First, it was hypothesized that less pacifist students would associate war with necessity. This prediction was not supported. This result highlights that findings about representations of the war as a generic concept (e.g., such as Van der Linden et al., 2011) do not necessarily apply to representations of specific conflicts. In retrospect, this is not surprising if one considers that WWI-at least in most European countries-is the archetype of the war that was not necessary. Finally, we did not find any representation of WWI as opposing good people and villains. Once again, this could be the result of the type of question asked that did not leave much space for elaboration. Further, this result could be understood at least partially by looking at the historical evolution of the representations of the conflict. Since the Locarno Treaty of the 1920s, WWI tends to be less interpreted as having opposed "good" and "evil" forces, but rather as a conflict where the masses were all victims. The narrative of reconciliation promoted by European integration (see, e.g., Haas, 1958) may have also influenced this perception.
In summary, the present results suggest that, even if social representations are moderately linked to attitudes, the First World War can still be interpreted as a matrix to pacifist attitudes. What we have learned from this research about the contemporary views toward large-scale violence is that the young Europeans from our sample do not appear to glorify the First World War, regardless of their level of pacifism. Although five generations have passed, this event is still considered in a principally negative manner. In short, as is often the case in the direct aftermath of a war, social representations of WWI might keep functioning as a symbolic reservoir to warn against war 100 years after the event. There are reasons to believe this is especially true of WWI. In the introduction, we pointed out that WWI was quickly reframed as "the war to end all wars" and that this representation of war had important sociopolitical consequences (Rémond, 1984) . We suggest that these strong historical links between specific representations of the Great War and pacifism have persisted to this day, especially in Europe. Indeed, one of the central reasons of European construction and one of Europe's core values is the establishment and consolidation of peace. Besides, WWI is still considered by contemporary Europeans as having a high importance in the history of the world (WWI is perceived as the second most important event in World's history; see Liu et al., 2005) and the commemorations of its Centenary in Europe is unprecedented (see, e.g., Wellings, 2016; Winter, 2014) . In view of these observations, this major bloodbath could still have a potentially virtuous function 100 years later: It would serve as a warning by reminding Europeans of the past disaster. These observations complement recent findings by Bouchat et al. (2017) that demonstrated that WWI victimization is linked to current pacifist attitudes of young Europeans and that suggested that this very link was explained by the presence of social representations of WWI favoring peace in the formerly victimized countries. Of the lessons that appraising the representations of a 100-year-old event can offer, this one is not the least valuable. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Naturally, the relevance of WWI to contemporary political attitudes goes beyond pacifism. A central trope in representations of WWI is the opposition between elites and ordinary individuals. This opposition was obvious in judgments of perceived constraints on involvement in the war, which were much higher with respect to frontline soldiers than officers and for ordinary people than soldiers. As is clear from a vast literature on the collective memory of WWI (Mosse, 1991) , this opposition maps onto a moral continuum opposing the greedy elites to the victimized people. Naturally, such an opposition resonates today as the left wing versus the right wing continuum is progressively complemented, or replaced, by an opposition between the "haves" and "have nots" or the elites and the people. So, we believe that the significance of WWI for contemporary political attitudes is far from exhausted at the end of this article.
Beyond pacifist attitudes, the specific representational patterns observed-such as the emphasis on negative outcomes of the conflict-are potentially linked to other variables such as type of study and gender of participants (see below) but also, to macrolevel factors such as temporal distance with the event. The impact of this type of variables on representations of the Great War is extensively discussed in an article by Bouchat et al. (2019) . Given that the issue of conflict is at least a century old, we expect contemporary European students to interpret it in broad and abstract terms because of their lack of nuanced knowledge. Part of social representations of WWI would then be associated with representations of war in general and more specifically, of its negative consequences. This is especially the case in societies that have not been at war for decades, such as most of the ones represented in our sample.
In addition to its specific focus on the links between attitudes and representations, the present study is one of the first to address the question of the social representations of the Great War in psychological science. In line with the sociodynamic approach (see Doise et al., 1992) , we have shown that young European students from 10 countries share similar representations of the Great War and that they occupy different positions in this representational field depending on their nationality, gender, and social category. For instance, the existence of a specific "Serbian-centric" lexical class suggests that for Serbs, the Great War is primarily interpreted from a national prism rather than from a European or international perspective that is much more widespread in most other countries. Indeed, this class refers almost exclusively to specific names of battles, places, and famous characters, directly linked to Serbian's experience of WWI. Such a pattern can be understood given the enormous impact WWI had on Serbian society-the Serbian death toll is one of the highest of WWI-the teaching of history was focused on national history and the exaltation by Serbian authorities of the past that identifies the nation as the victim and neighboring states as aggressors (Rosoux, Bouchat, & Klein, in press ). Indeed, since WWI, Serbian media and authorities have disseminated narratives emphasizing the sufferings endured by the Serbs during the war, including reports of them in a chain of victimizing events, some dating back more than six centuries (see Rosoux et al., in press) .
The overrepresentation of women in the "negative evaluation" classes is consistent with the findings of previous studies. For instance, Sarrica (2007) and Van der Linden, Bizumic, Stubager, and Mellon (2011) show that females tend to interpret war more in terms of negative emotions and negative consequences than their male counterparts. This effect could be linked to the perception of the social roles and stereotypes traditionally associated with women and the image of the war as mainly fought by men (see also Nincic & Nincic, 2002) . Finally, the fact that history students are overrepresented in a class including the formal consequences of the conflict and that psychology students are overrepresented in classes emphasizing negative evaluations of WWI might reflect an educational bias where emphasis is likely to be placed, respectively, on knowledge of specific aspects of historical events and their consequences, and on the other part, on the human and emotional consequences. In summary, although it was not the main aim of the study and that the sample used is quite specific, this is the first time that the representational of WWI is examined on such a scale. As such, these results constitute a primary source of information for scientists working on the memory of distant wars.
While the present study offers new insights into the relationship between attitudes and social representations, it is characterized by several limitations. First, the sample sizes were not similar across countries. This could influence the set of representations highlighted given the differences of weight of each sample in the factorial analyses. More importantly, the composition of the sample of participants, while usual in this type of study (see, e.g., Bobowik et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2005 Liu et al., , 2009 , is quite specific (see Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) . It is composed of university students (mainly women studying psychology and history) born after the lifting of the "Iron Curtain," both more educated and potentially more in contact with other cultures (due to the Erasmus-type programs) than other members of their generation. Our findings were thus obtained from very limited samples within the 10 countries and may hence underestimate differences between countries. The fact that these sample are composed of a majority of women who tend to interpret war more in terms of negative emotions and negative consequences than males, may also have influenced the general pattern of representations highlighted. Yet, we believe that in spite of this limitation, benefitting from this large international sample allows us to make a major step forward in the study of the links between social representations of the WWI and attitudes.
Second, the nature of the survey question aimed at appraising the social representations of the conflict may have limited the variety of representations presented by the participants. Indeed, the question was designed for short answers (one word or a few) and did not allow for more elaboration. For instance, it was not possible to obtain narratives that may have revealed more nuanced representations of the conflict. However, given the need to translate the answers from 10 countries into English in order to run the content analysis, we stand by our decision to limit the length of the answers. An interesting future prospect might be to pair each word to a scale evaluating its emotionality and valence. This would add significant value to the interpretations of these representations and help sharpen our results.
Finally, having split the sample at the median level of pacifist attitudes resulted in one main issue. Given the high level of the median (5.5 on a 1 to 7 scale), we distinguished between very high pacifist individuals and less pacifist others, but most participants were nevertheless in favor of peace. As a result, we found interesting information on the relations between high pacifist attitudes and social representations of war but obtained far less information This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
on their links to pacifist attitudes. This high level of pacifism may be a legacy of the "long-peace" most of Europe has witnessed since 1945. The decline of violence as a means to resolve conflicts is a long-term historical trend (cf. Muchembled, 2008; Pinker, 2011) . Pinker (2011) for example argues that the "rights revolution" (i.e., the rejection of any form of violence against males, minorities, or even animals), which followed WWII, played a crucial role in this decline. The mostly middle-class students we probed may have been socialized in an ethos of peaceful resolution of conflict consistent with this historical development. We attempted to overcome this issue by dividing the sample into three groups in accordance with their level of pacifist attitudes. In this case, the results were rather similar to the ones we obtained with two groups. Further, studies on participants that are more likely to approve war (e.g., students in a military school) and designs allowing richer statistical analyses (e.g., discriminant analyses, multinomial logistical regression) would be welcome.
Conclusion
To our knowledge, the present article constitutes the first attempt at investigating the links between attitudes and social representations in a large sample of Europeans students. Using a social representational approach, it helps fill a gap in the literature on attitudes toward peace and war by highlighting their links with specific representations of a conflict. In doing so, it establishes a connection between the mainstream approaches of attitudes relying on an individual premise and social representational theory. Furthermore, the present study offers the first insights of how young Europeans represent the Great War 100 years after the event. We suggest that even one century after this conflict, social representations of WWI might still function as a symbolic reservoir to warn against war. This study reveals that addressing people's orientations toward peace and war cannot be performed in abstracto. It needs to take into account how such attitudes are grounded in concrete historical events that transcend the existence of respondents. Thus, beyond contextual variables that may impact on pacifist attitudes here and now, one needs to consider the role of foundational events, such as WWI, whose impact on such attitudes ripples across generations. That we found such a close association between social representations of WWI and pacifist attitudes in a sample of young Europeans who were born 75 years after the end of this conflict provides strong evidence in favor of this proposition.
